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ABSTRACT
This study was conducted to determine quantitative measures
of reliability for operational software in embedded avionics com-
puter systems. Analysis was carried out on data collected during
flight testing and from both static and dynamic simulation testing.
Failure rate was found to be a useful statistic for estimating
software quality and recognizing reliability trends during the
operational phase of software development. The scope of the
analysis was limited due to insufficient environment where ade-
quate maintenance and service records for avionics systems are
kept.
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F I.. INTRODUCTION
This is the final report o£ the third phase of the
Measurementof SoftwareReliabilityStudy conductedfor the
NASA LangleyResearchCenter, under contractNASI-14592.
The purpose of this studywas to developquantitative
measures o£ reliabilityfor operationalavionicssoftware
systems. Previous studies (References1 and 2_ analyzed
measures of softwarereliabilityusing data acquiredduringthe
developmentphase of a data base softwareproduct,-whichwas
designedto operate in a typical batch environment. Failure
rate and failure ratio were found to be statisticallyvalid
measures for predictingsoftwarereliabilityduring the
developmentphase.
During this study, an attemptwas made to further examine
the statisticalattributesof these two measuresas quantities
for estimatingand predictingsoftwarereliabilityduringthe
operationalphase of a softwareproduct. However, availability
o£ adequate data to conduct reliabilitymeasurementanalysis
has been a very limitingelement in this study. In order to
support this study,data reportingwas requiredon error
frequency,cause of error,and time requiredto isolate and
correct errors and recertifythe software. Unfortunatelythe
data sourcescontactedduring the study were software
developmentand maintenancegroupsthat retain softwareerror
data primarilyfor diagnosticpurposes.
Much of the burden of collecting and assembling the data
rested upon the development groups because of the distributed
nature of the data. Every attemptwas made to select data that
were collectedduring the final test and verificationstageso£
the developmentcycle;thus, the code maturitywould be near
that of an initial operationalrelease. The troublereport
data were correlatedwith CPU time data to establishanalytic
data sets. These data sets consist o_ composed data, collected
during static simulation testing, dynamic simulation testing,
and actual _light testing.
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II. OVERVIEW
Prior to detaileddiscussionof the operationalsoftware
measures studied,it is importantto considerwhat is meant by
softwarereliability. To a great extent this is dependentupon
the softwareapplicationintended.
To a group responsible for the design of advanced computer
systems, the issue o£ reliability is of central concern. The
ability o£ the software to operate correctly as the system
environment changes, such as in the fault tolerant technology,
is a major element affecting the overall system performance.
To a group responsible for design, implementation, and
validation of software products, the issue of reliability is
commonly replaced by the issue o£ quality. Any large or
sophisticated operational software product contains an
unidentifiable number of errors. Although these errors may be
due to coding, formulation, or design, the central problem
facing the development group is the identification and
correction of as many of these errors as possible prior to
release. Clearly the fewer the errors remaining in the
product, the higher the quality. In this environment a
"software failure" is hardly applicable. The software never
fails to operate - it always operates, either correctly or
incorrectly. Correct operation however, is not always formally
specified and generally includes implied requirements.
It is apparentthat given identicalspecifications,two
different software development groups will each produce a
product o£ different quality. Similarly, differing
specifications for the same product submitted to a single
development group will result in products o€ different
quality. The functions of specification and implementation
each directly contribute to software quality.
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The central issue facinga softwaredevelopmentgroup is
that of determining when the product is "ready" for operational
release. Established practices include extensive laboratory
testing in both static and dynamically controlled environments,
testing by an independent software group, £1ight testing, and
acceptance testing by the eventual user. A typical procedure
used for identifyingand correctingerrors consistsof trouble
reporting. Each report is fully investigated by a software
systemsengineerand correctiveaction, if any, is
recommended. At this point the report and recommended action
are reviewed and an action decision is made. Any code
corrections are entered into the next modification and testing
continues.
This systemprovidestight control over the identification
and correction of software errors. Also, it provides formal
documentation on detected software errors. Generally however,
the accumulated data resulting from this procedure does not
include CPU time or the number o£ times the soCtware has been
executed in a given time period. Hence, it is di_€icult to
quantitatively establish software quality or reliability at the
time the code is released for operational service.
Such quantitative measures could be readily used by the
development group, the program management group, and the
operations group to aid in planning, costing, and decision
making tasks. These applications should be pursued for their
inherent value; however, quantitative measures have yet another
application. Quantitative measures o£ software quality or
reliability can assist the systems designer in analyzing
software/hardware interactions and in quantitatively speciCying
the overall system performance.
Previous studies (References I and 2) have assessed the
various merits and properties o£ several reliability measures.
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The failure ratio, U, is defined as
U = F/N
where P is the number of failuresor softwareerrorsobserved
in N runs in a given calendarperiod, usually one month. The
failure rate, FR, is defined as
FR = f/t
where f is the number of softwareerrors observedduringthe
total CPU time accumulatedover a given calendarperiod.
Additionally,the indicatorMTBF is defined as
MTBF = 1/FR
which is an importantquantity because it is analogous to
commonlyused hardwarereliabilityexpressions.
The principle indicator derived and analyzed from this
study was the failure rate, with MTBF presented for comparative
and illustrative purposes. The form in which the data was
available, in effect dictated the use o£ failure rate. During
avionic software development, CPU time has been demonstrated to
be more easily collectable than the number o£ initial program
loads (IPL), regardless of the type of testing, i.e., flight
testing or dynamic simulation testing. Additionally, flight
time and ground time are traditionally well maintained
statistics for aircraft, and hence for their avionics systems.

rIII. DATA RESOURCES
The operational environment selected for this study was an
embedded avionics computer system. An attempt was made to
obtain error data from several different avionics systems. The
two contractually designated data sources were the A-7 Avionics
Development Program, Naval Weapons Center, China Lake,
California, and the F-Ill Operational Flight Program,
Sacramento Air Logistics Center at McCellan Air Force Base,
Sacramento, California. In addition, the Aerospace Corporation
identified four other potential data sources: the F-14
avionics computer program office at the Pacific Missile Test
Center, Point Magu, California, the Naval Air Development
Center, Warmister, Pennsylvania, the Air Force Avionics
Laboratory, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, and
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, California. A
preliminary investigation was conducted at these facilities to
determine the availability of data suitable for a reliability
measurement study.
Naval Weapons Center (NNC)
Software error data from the embedded avionics computer
system on the A-7 aircraft was available for this study from
the Naval Weapons Center. The data came from two major
software releases. The NWC-2 software package provided actual
operational flight time data and the NWC-3 release provided
data from the final test and evaluation phase of the software
system, including more than 5000 hours of flight time and
simulation time.
During the operational lifetime of a software release,
errors are isolated by a full investigation of all trouble
reports. There is a formal mechanism for reporting system
computer errors; however, many reports are verbal and complete
documentation for all reported errors does not exist. When it
7
was available, informationon the frequency of error _.
occurrencesexisted only in narrativeform. After an actual
softwareerror is catalogued,an operationalfix is generated
and the code is correctedin the next release. The time and
effort requiredto investigateeach reportwas not documented,
but it was estimatedthat a fix takes about one month.
Before the NWC-2 avionicssoftwarepackage was released in
May, 1977 for operationaluse, through testing and evaluation
phaseswere performedto detectmany of the errors in the
software. An additionalperiod of verificationand validation
was used so that by the end of the examinationsthe software
r
was essentiallyerror free. The data was collectedfrom
various aircraft flightsover a period of thirteenmonths from
May, 1977 throughMay, 1978. It was acquiredduring a visit to
the Naval Weapons Center on January 22, 1979.
Three errorswere detectedfollowingthe release of the
NWC-2 software. One was detectedby the fleet almost
immediatelyafter the release,and two by the Naval Weapons
Center early in the release. Although the exact time of the
error detectionsis not known, the data includedthe total
number of flighthours for each month, the number of errors
detected,the type of error (fatal,critical,or non-critical),
and the month the errorwas corrected. The monthly flight
hours and the number of planes in the fleet are classified
information;however,the total monthly flighthours are
unclassifiedand have been used in the data analysis.
The NWC-3 was released during the test and evaluation phase
in January, 1979. NWCcollected error data during the
verification and validation phase which began at the end o£
February and continued until the end o£ April. During this
period of acquisition, nine codes were released, denoted here
6B, 6D, 6F, 7A, 8A, 8B. 8C. _n$ _n. The perio4 o£ operation
for each o_ the codes is given in Table I. Note that the codes
TABLE 1
NWC-5 CODE RELEASE DATES
Cod_____e Operational Dates
6B 15 Aug 78 - 26 Sep 78
6D 15 Sep 78 23 Oct 78
6E 28 Sep 78 20 Nov 78
7A 29 Nov 78 - 9 Jan 79
8A 3 Jan 79 - 24 Jan 79
8B 24 Jan 79 - 16 Mar 79
8C 8 Mar 79
8D 14 Mar 79 - 27 Mar 79
_-- Flight time >
(__ WeaponsLab )
_-- SimulationLab )
* ( I ! _ ! I J I I i I I I i 4 )
J A S O N D ff F M A M J J A
1978 1979
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A7A and 8A, and codes 8B and 8C have overlapping flight dates as
shown in the time table. The data came from three sources:
actual test flights, the weapons laboratory and the simulation
laboratory. This data included CPU time, number of errors
encountered, and detailed trouble reports about the types o£
errors found, with a brief description o£ each. Naval Weapons
Center personnel maintained time logs during test flights and
dynamic simulation tests, and it was thought that it would be
possible to correlate computer time and errors from this data.
Sacramento Air Logistics Center
The F-Ill avionics system consists of three computers: the
Guidance and Navigation Computer (GNC) for general navigation
tasks, the Weapons Defense Computer (WDC) for weapons
deliverance tasks, and the Navigation Computer Unit (NCU) for
navigation and control tasks. The original software was
developed by the General Dynamics Corporation. The F-Ill
software section at McClellan is responsible for the
development, integration, and test and evaluation of the
software.
The F-Ill softwaremanagementis based on an 18-month
life-cycle. User requirements,and changes in mission
requirementsthat affectthe overall system and cost are
thoroughlyreviewed,resultingin a coordinatedblock of
modifications. These undergo £ull-scalestatic and dynamic
testing during the developmentphase and are then installedand
implementedin the system. There is an independenttest and
evaluation(IT_E)of the code which is usually performedby a
contractortest team. The IT_E phase is conducted,for the
most part, on a dynamic Simulator. The troublereports
generatedduring the IT_E phase are the source of the software
error records. The softwaresection also maintainsaccounting
records from which mean time to repair (MTTR]may be
calculated. The next phase is engineeringflighttesting,which
i0
is performed on an instrumented aircraft. Finally, user flight
testing is conducted on non-instrumented aircraft.
Although this facility was designated as a good data source
prior to study execution, further investigation revealed that
no logs were kept of flight time or CPU time. Because it was
determined that several man months would have been required in
order to extract any relevant data, it was decided not to
pursue this source further.
Pacific Missile Test Center (PMTC)
The Paci£ic MissileTest Center's formal systemfor
cataloging all avionics computer system errors is called the
Airborne Weapons Corrective Action Program (AWCAP). Software
errors are found by a full investigation o£ the trouble reports
collected during the development and operational lifetime of
the software release. Each reportedproblemis enteredinto
the computer data base and updated whenever more information is
received. The trouble report contains the following items:
Systemcomponentidentification
Problem brief
Occurrences(includingdate and sourceof the report]
Problem description
Configuration
Correctiveaction
Action summary
References
The reliability data are embedded in the problem
description, the corrective action taken, and the action
summary, all o£ which are in narrative form. AWCAP provides
considerable sorting and reporting capabilities; however, this
system provided no established procedure £or flagging timing
- information, so it was decided that this data source could not
be utilized.
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Naval Air Development Center (NADC)
The NADC software development cycle is similar to that o£
the A-7 office at NWC and to that o£ the F-14 office at the
Pacific Missile Test Center. Computer logs were kept during
the test and evaluation phases that could be used to calculate
the run time of the software over each day. From these it
might have been possible to correlate data from the trouble
reports. It was decidedthat no datawouldbe collectedfrom
the Naval Air Development Center because the P-5 software data
was quite similar in form and type to that of the Naval Weapons
Center, and personnel at this facility maintained that
approximately three man-months would have been necessary in
order to extract the required data.
Air Force Avionics Laboratory (AFAL)
AFAL was chosento perform the independentverificationand
validationtesting on the F-16 avionics softwaredevelopedby
the General DynamicsCorporation. Testing had been completed
on six versionsof the flighttape by January,1979. AFAL was
using the productiontape to train fleet pilots in the Pilot
TrainingOperation [PTO). A total of 48 hours of flighttime
was logged on two separatedates by various trainingpilots, 17
hours in January, 1979 and 51 hours in February,1979. They
collectedsoftwarereliabilitydata during this time, including
CPU time, and number and type o£ errors.
Delivery of the data was made by Major John Weber o£ AFAL
in March, 1979. It consisted of two months of data which were
very similar to the operational data from the NWC-2 software.
Although an agreement was made to supply as much data as needed
for statistical analysis, the final shipment of data was never
received, and the data supplied was too limited to be
statistically significant.
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Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)
The DevelopmentSection of JPL's Mission ControlComputer
Center (MC3) has for three years collectedsoftwareerror
data from the Voyager groundbase real-timesoftwarecomputer
system. It was thoughtthat this large data base could be used
to validatethe statisticalapproachto the A-7 and F-16
analysis,even though it came from a groundbased systemrather
than an airborne system.
During the three years the Voyager has £1own,there have
been only two errors involvingthe on-boardcomputer. One was
a memory hardwarefailure and the other was the transmittaland
loading of an incorrectset of commands. In contrast,the
softwareon the real-timegroundbased computer systemhas had
between two and three thousandreportedfailuresduring the
last three years. The records o£ these errors includedthe
time of error occurrenceand level of severity. This data was
providedon a weekly basis from the 48th week of 1978 through
the 20th week of 1979, coveringa total o£ 9756.138hours of
operation.
13

IV. DATA ANALYSIS
The data base consisted of two sets of data: (i) from the
Naval Weapons Center, error data from the A-7 avionics software
package, consisting of the NWC-2 utilization code and the NWC-3
release, and (2) from the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, error data
from the Voyager's ground based computer system. The principal
statistical analyses performed on this data were the
calculation of the failure rate (FR), number of failures
divided by the CPU time accumulated over a given calendar
period, and the mean time between failures (MTBF). Evaluation
of the data was determined from simple linear regression
analysis of the failure rate on the successive codes and/or the
release date.
Other statistics were investigated, including the
cumulative mean time between failures (total number of CPU time
divided by the accumulative number of errors) and an
exponential model for relating failure rates from one calendar
period to the next, but these statistics did not yield any
significant findings. Due to the lack of information on the
number of runs in the data, the failure ratio (number of
failures per calendar interval divided by the total number of
runs) could not be calculated.
Naval Weapons Center (NWC)
Error severity was established for all the errors which
were reported to have occurred during a software release.
Severity ranged from critical to non-critical. A fatal error
caused the system to fail completely; a critical error
indicated that one part of the system failed, but the system
continued to function with, perhaps, the wrong information; and
a non-critical error was an annoyance type, such as a misnamed
variable or a pilot preference for certain mechanisms or ways.
Table 2 shows the NWC-2 error data ordered by flight date.
Fatal, critical and non-critical errors were assigned a i, 2 or
15
TABLE 2
NWC-2 FLIGHT DATES
No. o£ No. o£
.Flight Date Flight hours Errors Type of Error
May 77 11829 1 3
June 77 13338 1 3
July 77 11536 1 3
Aug 77 13697 0
Sep 77 12639 0
Oct 77 12353 0
Nov 77 12393 0
Dec 77 10485 0
Jan 78 11129 0
Feb 78 12663 0
Mar 78 14586 0
Apr 78 12329 0
May 78 9613 0
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° 3, respectively. Only three non-critical errors occurred in
this software. Since the exact time of the occurrences is not
known, it is assumed that one error occurred each month for the
first three months. Figure 1 is a plot of the failure rates
for these three months. Since the correlation coefficient is
zero, nothing can be concluded about the relationship of
failure rate and software reliability from this data. In fact,
this is really an ideal case, because the errors detected were
correctly fixed and the software has been operating
successfully ever since. The remarkable MTBF of 4062 hours and
FR of .0002, can partly be explained by the fact that the
diversity of aircraft this software was run on, tended to
isolate errors not captured by the final test and evaluation
phase of the development cycle.
The NWC-3 data required some organization before analysis
could be initiated. The 87 discrepancy reports were divided
into three groups depending on whether they were from actual
test flights, the weapons laboratory, or from the simulation
laboratory. A total of 62 errors occurred during the period of
5753 hours of data made available. Table 3 shows the breakdown
of error types for the three data sets. Note that non-critical
errors occurred most frequently, followed by critical and
finally by fatal errors.
Table 3 also shows that MTBF is lowest for actual flight
time and highest for the simulation laboratory. When arranged
by code, Table 4 shows that the software was more reliable as
each code was released. Note that codes run on all three
systems, again show the highest reliability at the simulation
laboratory. This probably indicates that simulation tests do
not detect as many errors as actually flying the software, and
that failure rate for all NWC-3 data combined is not a
meaningful statistic.
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Figure i. NWC-2 Failure Rate vs Flight Date
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TABLE 3
NWC-3 ERROR TYPES
ACTUAL FLIGHT TIME
Type of Error No. of Errors MTBF FR
1 1 388.0 0.0026
2 3 129.33 0.0077
3 15 25.87 0.0387
Total 19 20.42 0.0490
WEAPONS LABORATORY
2 7 172.43 0.0058
3 26 46.42 0.0215
Total 33 36.58 0.0303
SIMULATION LABORATORY
2 2 2080.0 0.0005
3 8 520.0 0.0019
Total 10 410.0 0.0002
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TABLE 4 --
NWC-3 ERROR DATA BY CODE
ACTUAL FLIGHT TIME
FAILURE RATE
Cod__.=_e FR MTBF Type I Type 2 Type 3
6B 0,25 4,0 0,25
6D 0,375 2,667 0,125 0.25
6E 0.1429 7,0 0,0476 0,0952
6F 0.12 8.333 0.12
7A 0.125 8.0 0.0416 0.0833
8A
8B 0.0174 57.47 0.0058 0.0116
8C 0.025 40.0 0.025
8D 0.0252 39.68 0.0252
WEAPONS LABORATORY
6B 0.04 25.0 0.0081 0.0324
6D 0.025 40.0 0.003 0.0240
6F 0.083 12.005 0.0833
7A 0.02 50.0 0.0042 0.0167
8A 0.041 24.39 0.0167 0.0250
8B 0.018 55.55 0.0042 0.0042
SIMULATION LABORATORY
6B 0.0031 322.58 0.0016 0.0016
6D 0.0063 158.73 0.0063
6E 0.0031 322.58 0.0014 0.0014
7A 0.0028 357.14 0.0028
8A 0.0007 1428.57 0.0007
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r Table S is a summary of the data by month. For example,
one software failure was detected during 7/78, zero during
8/78, six during 9/78 etc. In addition, it can be seen that
the numbers o£ errors decreases in each successive release and
that those that occurred were non-critical. Figures 2=4 are
plots of the failure rate for each code run on the three
systems. The correlation coefficient _or the actual flight
time data shows a strong negative correlation or _ailure rate
with time. Any correlation between _ailure rate and time is
negligible for the weapons laboratory. The simulation
laboratory shows the highest correlation, although as mentioned
earlier, it is not clear that this is valid data for predicting
software reliability. The same conclusions emerge when failure
rate is plotted by month, as seen in Figures 5-7. No
additional information was yielded when _ailure rate was
plotted for each error type separately.
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)
The best error information JPL could provide was the total
number of each type o_ error and the type or fix taken. These
are listed in Table 6. Since the time or occurrence o£ most or
the 154 errors was not transmitted, very little analysis was
possible. Failure rate was determined _or all errors occurring
during a given week and plotted on Figure 8. The MTBF was
calculated to be 63.35 hours and the FR 0.0158. Although
Figure 8 shows a slight positive correlation between Eailure
rate and time, more information on the type o_ errors that
occurred would have been required in order to draw conclusions
regarding the quality o€ the software.
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TABLE 5
NWC-3 ERROR DATA SUMMARY
/
No. of Flight No. of Errors FAILURE RATE
Software Time Type Type
1 2 3 FR MTBF 1 2 3Date Failures _Hours) .......
ACTUAL FLIGHT TIME
7/78 1 4.0 1 0.25 4.0 0.25
9/78 6 29.0 2 4 0.2069 4.833 0.069 0.1379
10/78 3 25.0 3 0.12 8.333 0.12
11/78 2 9.0 1 1 0.222 4.5 0.iii 0.Iii
12/78 1 15.0 1 0.0667 15.0 0.0667
1/79 3 189.5 1 2 0.0158 63.167 0.005 0.0102
3/79 3 114.5 3 0.0262 38.167 0.0262
WEAPONS LABORATORY
7/78 I0 247.0 2 8 0.0405 24.7 0.008 0.0324
9/78 9 336.0 1 8 0.0268 37.3 0.003 0.0283
10/78 2 24.0 2 0.0833 12.0 0.0833
11/78 5 240.0 1 4 0.0208 48.0 0.004 0.0167
1/79 7 360.0 3 4 0.0194 51.429 0.008 0.0111
SIMULATION LABORATORY
7/78 2 320.0 1 1 0.0063 160.0 0.003 0.0031
8/78 1 320.0 1 0.0031 320.0
9/78 2 640.0 2 0.0031 360.0 0.0031
10/78 2 720.0 1 I 0.0031 360.0 0.001 0.0014
12/78 2 720.0 2 0.0031 360.0 0.0031
1/79 1 1440.0 1 0.0007 1440.0 0.0007
• •
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TABLE 6
JPL ERROR CLASSIFICATION
Type Description No. off Errors
I Not a problem I0
2 Not worth £ixing 15
3 Source code £%x 48
4 Critical-makepatch 34
5 Under investigation 6
29
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Figure 8. Jet Propulsion Laboratory Failure Rate vs Date
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V. CONCLUSIONS
Failure rate appears to be a useful statistic for
estimating software quality and recognizing trends in the
reliability of operational avionics software. Although the
NNC-2 data is summary type data for a large sample of aircraft,
and thorough reliability measurement analysis requires data by
individual aircraft, a figure of merit may be associated with
the software at the time of its release to operational units
since the failure rate is decreasing with increasing
development time. While the Naval Weapons Center Provided
excellent statistical data during the final test and evalution
phase of the NWC-3 code, diagnostic efforts continued
throughout the operational acceptance testing and use, so that
a true operational figure of merit would not be available until
several months after the operational release. Because failure
rate decreases with each successive code release, there is an
implication that the code is continually maturing. Preliminary
results on the ground base computer system for the Voyager
would tend to indicate somewhat inferior software quality, yet
the system is highly functional. The degree of software
quality a system needs, is a question that must be answered in
the future.
The data available for this study was clearly insufficient
for any detailed reliability measurement analysis. Collection
o£ data would ideally come from an 9Perational environment
where continuous maintenance and service records were kept.
Such an opportunity may well exist within the military,
provided an agreeable data collection and transmission protocol
can be established, and security conflicts resolved.
31
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